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Abstract: Zone pricing in wholesale gasoline markets is a contentious topic in the public policy
debate. Refiners contend that they use zone pricing to be competitive with local rivals. Critics
claim that zone pricing benefits the oil industry and harms consumers. With a controlled
experiment, we investigate the competitive effects of zone pricing on consumers, retail stations,
and refiners vis-à-vis the proposed policy prescription of uniform wholesale pricing to retailers.
We also examine the issue of divorcement and the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon. The
former is the legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated, and the
latter is the perception that retail gasoline prices rise faster than they fall in response to random
walk movements in the world price for oil.
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1. Introduction
Few industries evoke such strong sentiments by consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and
policy makers as gasoline. The structure of the gasoline industry is extremely complex, making
the impact of common practices unclear and thus the focus of much public scrutiny. The
practice of zone pricing has been a particularly contentious topic in the public policy debate for
the past several years.1 Zone pricing is the industry term to describe the practice of refiners
setting different wholesale prices for retail gasoline stations that operate in different geographic
areas or zones. Refiners contend, as Chevron did, that they employ zone pricing to “price our
wholesale gasoline to our dealers at prices that will allow them to be competitive.”2 However,
state legislators and attorneys general propose legislation to ban zone pricing claiming that it
“only benefits the oil industry, to the detriment of consumers.”3
Another controversial issue that is debated in the gasoline industry is divorcement, the
legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated. Maryland was the first
state to pass such legislation in 1974 with a handful of other states following suit. A 2000 report
from Bill Lockyer, the Attorney General for the State of California, states that “members of the
Task Force believe the key to enhancing competition at the retail level is to eliminate vertical
integration by petroleum companies (p. 33).” However, in a prepared statement made before a
subcommittee of the U.S. Senate, Hastings (2002a) testified that “Divorcement will not lead to
lower prices, and may increase inefficiency (p. 7).”
The objective of our study is to design an environment that captures the essential
components of wholesale and retail gasoline markets and to use a controlled experiment to test
these opposing viewpoints. Within the confines of the laboratory, the impact of zone pricing and
divorcement can be evaluated while holding the geographic markets, production and delivery
costs, and the associated consumer demographics constant.4 Additionally, we can also preclude
entry at the retail level, thus setting a condition most unfavorable to zone pricing in terms of its
potential harm to consumers. Experimental economics is an ideal tool for addressing zone
1

For example, Maryland set up The Governor’s Task Force on Gasoline Zone pricing in 2000. The task force’s
report in September of 2001 promotes a prohibition on zone pricing. See Isaac, Oaxaca, and Reynolds (1998) for a
detailed discussion of retail price differentials in Arizona.
2

See Burtman (2000).
See “Testimony of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal Before the House Judiciary Committee,”
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/blum0407.htm, April 7, 2000. The California State Assembly recently considered
banning zone pricing (see Douglas (2003)).
4
Smith (1994) lists evaluation of policy proposals as one reason to conduct experiments.
3
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pricing. Currently, gasoline wholesalers are free, as Shepard (1993, p. 63) notes, to charge
“station-specific” wholesale prices. In an experiment, we can control the extent, if any, to which
zone pricing can be employed in situations where explicit collusion among the wholesalers is not
possible. Allowing zone pricing in one treatment serves as a benchmark for evaluating the
complementary treatment, banning zone pricing by mandating uniform wholesale prices. Such a
comparison affords a direct examination of the welfare effects of the proposed legislation on
consumers, retailers, and wholesalers. Similarly, we can vary the degree of vertical integration
to assess the impact of divorcement. A chief advantage of a controlled laboratory study is that we
can precisely measure buyer welfare, which cannot be done in naturally occurring gasoline
markets because consumer preferences are not observable. With an experiment we also have
precise data on the actual transaction prices paid by consumers as opposed to just posted prices at
retail stations.
With our data set, we also explore the phenomenon that retail gasoline prices adjust
asymmetrically to cost shocks, yet another topic that has led to much public outcry. Several
papers have found that gasoline prices rise more rapidly than they fall (see Johnson, 2002; Reilly
and Witt, 1998; Borenstein et al., 1997; Castanias and Johnson, 1993; and Bacon, 1991).5 Even
though the data suggest that the asymmetry is relatively short lived (see Johnson, 2002), when
prices climb quickly, the popular press is filled with stories about price gouging, exploitation of
market power and the possibility of collusion. Of course, there are less pejorative explanations
as well. One such gasoline spike occurred in the Midwest during the spring of 2000. Bulow,
Fischer, Creswell, and Taylor (2003) study this period and determine that the price response was
due to supply interruptions and argue against the possibility of collusive explanations. Further,
they conclude that such episodes are likely to occur with increasing frequency as more and more
localities place constraints on gasoline blends.6
Other explanations for asymmetric responses include inventory costs, menu costs, trigger
pricing strategies, and consumer search costs (see Johnson 2002, Castanias and Johnson 1993
and references therein). Using weekly gasoline prices from Los Angeles between 1968 and
5

As Peltzman (2000) reports, this phenomenon is not unique to gasoline. It thus remains unclear why consumers
respond so strongly to changes in gasoline prices. One potential explanation is that unlike other products,
consumers process a large volume of gasoline price information daily even when they are not considering a purchase
due to the prominence of posted pricing in this market. Conspicuous price information for an extensively used
product may make it easier for people to detect price changes when retailer cost changes are less obvious.
6
The Midwest gas spike of 2000 centered on the implementation of a new standard for cleaner burning reformulated
gasoline.
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1971, Castanias and Johnson (1993) contend that the data closely match the predictions of
Maskin and Tirole’s (1988) adjustment model. Johnson (2002) argues that empirical data from
the mid to late 1990s are consistent with a search cost model. Our laboratory investigation
provides direct empirical evidence on asymmetric price responses and their indicatives of
anticompetitive behavior, while explicitly controlling factors such as buyer search and menu
costs.7

2. Industry Background
The first step in the production and delivery of gasoline is the extraction of crude oil.
Oil is then traded in a global market and transported to refineries. At the refinery, oil is
converted into gasoline and other products including diesel fuel, asphalt and jet fuel. Gasoline is
then piped to various distribution terminals. In the U.S., these terminals are located throughout
the country near most major metropolitan areas. At this point in the process, gasoline is a pure
commodity in that the supplier is indistinguishable and, in fact, pipe lines carry gasoline from
multiple suppliers. At the terminal, gasoline is collected in large holding tanks by the various
wholesalers operating in the proximity. At this point in the process brand specific additives are
inserted.8 The price of gasoline from these holding facilities is referred to as the rack price. The
gasoline is then shipped by tanker truck to individual retail locations.
Not only can consolidation change the number of competitors, it can also change the
degree of vertical integration present in a given geographic market as there are several different
contractual arrangements between retail outlets and refiners. Branded stations must sell the
specified brand of gasoline. Some branded stations are company operated, meaning that the
refiner owns the retail outlet and sets retail prices. Alternatively, a branded station can be either
a lessee dealer or a dealer owned station in which case the retail outlet sets the retail price but it
is obligated to buy the refiner’s brand of gas. The difference between a lessee dealer and a dealer
owned station pertains to the ownership of the retail facility. The price of gasoline delivered to a
station is referred to as a Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price. In practice, refiners can engage in
zone pricing by setting the DTW price to reflect market conditions in very specific geographic
7

Cason and Friedman (2002) and Cason, Friedman, and Milam (2003) also examine the price stickiness with respect
to random walk shocks to cost, but they also impose switching costs on their human buyers in their laboratory
markets.
8
Unbranded gasoline is gasoline with no branded additives. Special gasoline blends such as the CARB gasoline
required for California are produced at the refinery.
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locations, possibly as small as a single station. Under these types of arrangements, the stations
can either be supplied directly by the refiner or can purchase gas from a branded jobber. The
term jobber refers to an intermediary that delivers gas from the rack to the retail location.9 A
fourth category of retailer is the independent station.

Independent stations typically sell

unbranded gasoline. They are also free to set their own retail prices and can acquire gas directly
from the terminal or via a jobber with the constraint that only a branded jobber can deliver
branded gasoline.10 While a small percentage of independent stations are dealer supplied, most
are supplied by jobbers.
Hastings (2002b) uses ARCO’s acquisition of the independent chain Thrifty in southern
California to examine the impact of a reduction in the number of non-integrated independent
retailers in the market.11 She observes no retail price differential due to the new ARCO store
being either a company operated or dealer operated station. This finding argues against the
divorcement proposals issued by several communities that would force wholesalers and retailers
of branded gasoline to be separate. In the event that the retailers have market power,12 forcing
retailers to be independent of the wholesaler could lead to a double marginalization problem,
resulting in higher retail prices for non-integrated outlets. Barron and Umbeck (1984) and Vita
(2000) provide support for this hypothesis.
Given the complexity of the gasoline industry and the incompleteness of naturally
occurring field data, it is not surprising that there is ambiguity about the effects of certain
actions. The laboratory provides an environment in which factors such as buyer preferences and
search patterns can be held constant. By exogenously manipulating the strategic capabilities of
wholesalers, policies such as zone pricing and divorcement can be directly evaluated. Further, in
the laboratory direct evidence can be gathered about responsiveness of the retail prices to supply
shocks including changes in crude oil prices and the impact of changes in the number or
composition of competitors.

Beyond profits and retail prices, laboratory studies can also

9

Like refiners, jobbers can also set station-specific prices.
During rack inversions, a situation in which branded rack prices are below unbranded rack prices, wholesalers of
branded gasoline can place limits on the quantity jobbers acquire at the terminal effectively preventing independent
stations from acquiring the cheaper branded gasoline. In addition, in times of shortages, unbranded stations are
typically supplied last.
11
Hastings (2002b) also investigates the impact of a reduction in the overall number of competitors but concludes
that the elimination of a competitor is not responsible for the observed 5 cents per gallon price increase.
12
Hastings (2002b, p. 6) notes that “Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997), Borenstein and Shepard (1996), and
Slade (1992) provide empirical evidence consistent with local retail market power.”
10
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evaluate social welfare which is not possible in the field as data are not available as to the value
consumers receive from purchasing gasoline.
3. A Vertical Model of Gasoline Markets
Our model of the gasoline industry consists of N refiners who compete to sell branded13
gasoline to R gasoline retailers,14 who in turn compete to sell gasoline to final consumers. Only
refiner i can sell its branded gasoline bi. The cost per unit to refiner i for supplying gasoline of
type bi is ci. Based upon the types of contracts that exist in the retail gasoline market, each retail
station is constrained to sell a specific brand of gasoline at an exogenously determined location
on a grid. The location of outlet ρ is given by an integer pair, (s, a) where s ∈ {1, 2,…, S} and a
∈ {1, 2,…, A}. Thus each station ρ (rs , a ),bi is indexed by location, brand, and retailer identity r
∈ R. Note that identifying the location and the retailer is not redundant as multiple outlets can
operate at the same location. It is quite common for two stations to be located on opposite sides
of the street at the same intersection. Further, the retailer identity and the brand type are not
redundant as there could be multiple retailers selling the same brand, as would occur in a market
with both company operated and lessee dealer stations. The per unit price charged to a consumer
by a retail outlet is p ρ r

( s , a ), bi

.

Each buyer has a value v for one unit of gasoline. Buyers in the market are characterized
by brand preference and location. A fraction ω bi of the buyers have a preference for brand bi,
meaning that these buyers gain additional utility β bi > 0 if they consume brand bi. The fraction
N

of consumers who do not have a brand preference is defined as ω b0 with ω b0 = 1 − ∑ ω bn . For
n =1

customers with no brand preference we define β b0 ≡ 0 .

To distinguish the location of a

consumer from the location of a retailer, the buyer’s location is denoted by the pair (σ, α) where

σ ∈ {1, 2,…, S} and α ∈ {1, 2,…, A}. The percentage of buyers at a particular location is
determined by the density function

f (⋅) defined over the S × A possible locations

13

As the primary focus of this paper is on zone pricing, divorcement, and asymmetric price responses, the
environment is simplified by only considering branded gasoline. The impact of branded versus unbranded gasoline
is beyond the scope of this paper.
14
R and r are used to denote retail level players and the Greek versions, Ρ and ρ of these letters denote the retail
outlets. These groups are not isomorphic as a retailer can operate multiple outlets.
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with Σ Σ f ( s, a ) = 1 . Buyers incur a travel cost d (⋅) which is increasing and convex in the
s a

distance

traveled.

In

this

model,

distance

is

defined

by

the

norm

( s, a ), (σ ,α ) = s − σ + a − α which gives the number intersections a buyer located at (σ, α)

must travel to reach the retail station ρ (rs ,a ),bi .15
In naturally occurring economies, gasoline retailers must first acquire inventory from the
refiner before selling the gasoline to the consumer. This sequencing puts the refiners that are not
vertically integrated in a theoretically advantageous position relative to their stations, but
generates the typical double marginalization problem.
maximize their profits conditioned on upstream prices.

In the downstream market, retailers
The upstream refiners are able to

incorporate retailer reaction when setting DTW prices.16
A buyer with a preference for brand j attempts to
max v + ς jρ (rs ,a ),b β b j − pρ (rs ,a ),b − d ( (s, a ), (σ ,α ) )

ρ (rs ,a ),bi ∈P

i

subject to v + ς jρ r

( s , a ),bi

i

β b − pρ
j

r
( s , a ),bi

− d ( (s, a ), (σ ,α ) ) ≥ 0

where ς jρ is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if station ρ (rs ,a ),bi sells brand j and is 0
otherwise.17 The problem is similar for buyers with no brand preference. If the consumer cannot
achieve a nonnegative utility from buying from any retailer, then the consumer does not purchase
gasoline and receives a utility of 0. In the event that two stations offer the same total utility to a
buyer, a buyer with a preference for bi selects an outlet selling this brand over an outlet selling
any other brand. Otherwise such ties are broken randomly.
In this industry, gasoline is delivered to retailers by tanker trucks. The retailer then holds
this gasoline in its inventory and sells the product to consumers over some period of time. To
incorporate this into the model, we suppose that when a retailer sells out of gasoline, a tanker
delivers K units of gasoline at a per unit price determined as described above. Each period, one

15

As the retailers and consumers are located on a grid, this taxi cab metric provides a more natural notion of
distance than does the standard Euclidian metric.
16
In what follows we use the terms wholesale price and DTW price interchangeably.
17
To include search costs, the buyer’s problem becomes one of maximizing expected benefits net of search costs
based upon the buyer’s beliefs about the distribution of prices. Again, as the primary focus of this paper is on zone
pricing, divorcement, and asymmetric price responses, we simplify the environment by not incorporating search
costs.
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buyer enters the market at a randomly chosen location and considers purchasing a single unit of
gasoline. A retailer only refills its tanks once it sells K units.
The retailer’s problem is to set prices at the retail outlets it operates so as to maximize its
expected profit. Let wρ r

( s , a ),bi

denote the per unit price charged by refiner i to a retail outlet ρ (rs ,a ),bi

for gasoline of type i. In addition to the cost of gasoline, a retailer incurs an additional cost of

eρ r

( s , a ), bi

.18 This cost is interpretable as an effort cost or as the cost associated with operating

service bays or convenience stores. Refiner i’s problem is to set wρ r

( s , a ),bi

for all ρ (rs ,a ),bi ∈ Ρ to

maximize profits. The equilibrium solution is a set of optimal prices for the refiners and the
retailers. This environment and institution, however, are too complex to identify any equilibria,
either analytically or numerically. In the next section, we will provide two reference predictions,
one analytical and one numerical. The former is the competitive or surplus-maximizing price,
and the latter the joint profit-maximizing or monopoly prices.
Before discussing our experimental design we briefly comment on the objective of this
section. This section constructs an environment and institution of wholesale and retail gasoline
markets that captures the essential features of naturally occurring markets. In particular, we
chose those elements (agents, variables, and actions) that are necessary to generate data to
address the questions posed in Sections 1 and 2.

Our methodological objective for the

experiment on which the model is based is heuristic or exploratory in nature (Smith, 1982), and
hence we are more interested in the richness of the strategic interactions in these markets than in
sharply defined predictions of a model. If out of this complexity emerges a distinct order of
outcomes in the experiment, more formal theoretical models would play a critical role in
summarizing the statement of the observed behavioral regularities. But that is beyond the scope
of this paper.

4. Experimental Design and Procedures

Our laboratory gasoline markets consist of N = 4 refiners that each produce branded
gasoline and R = 4 retailers who each operate 2 locations on a 7 × 7 grid. To the subjects, each

18

For simplicity, the role of the jobber has been suppressed in this model. The price charged by each retailer can be
considered to include delivery or this additional cost could be thought of as a separate jobber fee.
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brand is distinguished by its color: b1 = blue, b2 = pink, b3 = green, and b4 = red. Figure 1 depicts
the location and brand for each retail station.19
Buyers are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the grid, f ( s, a) =

1
. Further, the
49

likelihood that a buyer prefers brand i is ωbi = 0.20 and the benefit a buyer who prefers brand i
received from purchasing it is β bi = 25 . As each buyer has an inelastic demand for 1 unit valued
at v = 240 and has an insignificant impact upon the market, truthfully revealing robots serve as
the final consumers. With the market shown in Figure 1, there is a “center” area at (s, a) = (4, 4)
where each of the four branded retailers are “clustered”. Each retailer also operates an outlet in a
relatively “isolated” area in the “corner” of the grid. These two types of areas are meant to
address the claim of refiners that they use zone pricing to be competitive with their local rivals.20
The cost of traveling is d ( x) = 4 x 2 for x = 0, 1, …, 12. Given that β bi + v = 265 , no
consumer is willing to travel further than 8 blocks to purchase gasoline and would only be
willing to travel 7 intersections to a non-preferred brand outlet. The buyers have complete
information about current retail prices.21 Each laboratory session lasts 1200 periods. In each
period, which is every 1.7 seconds, a robot buyer from a randomly drawn location enters the
market, observes retail prices and makes a purchase decision. Given the complexity of this
market, we chose to implement a video game-like environment to capture the attention of the
subjects but also to allow them try many different strategies. Traditional posted price
experiments with one to two minute periods may allow subjects more time to ponder a decision,
but they also take much longer in order to generate feedback for the subject.22 Unsolicited
feedback from the subjects indicated that they very much enjoyed the experiment and their eyes
appeared never to wander from the screen.
We consider three experimental treatments to identify the impact of banning zone pricing
and limiting vertical integration in retail gasoline markets. In the zone pricing (or baseline)
treatment, refiners have the ability to set wρ r

( s , a ),bi

for each ρ (rs ,a ),bi ∈ Ρ, as described in the

preceding section. In this treatment, each retailer observes two location specific wholesale prices
19

The information was presented graphically to the subjects.
See footnote 2.
21
This assumption could be relaxed; however, a priori one would expect that search costs could have the same price
increasing effect in both the zone pricing and the uniform pricing treatments.
22
See Davis and Korenok (2005) for a discussion of period length in posted offer markets.
20
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but could not shift inventory between locations.23 We will compare this treatment to our uniform
pricing treatment in which legislation bans zone pricing. In terms of the model described above,
the uniform pricing treatment imposes the restriction that wρ r

( s , a ),bi

= wi for every station selling bi.

It is important to note that uniform pricing at the wholesale level does not imply uniform retail
prices. In both the zone pricing and uniform pricing treatments, refiners are able to change
wholesale prices throughout the 1200 periods. We measure the effects of divorcement by
comparing the baseline treatment with a company operated (company-op) treatment. In the
company-op treatment all of the retail stations are vertically integrated, which essentially
removes the intermediary and eliminates double marginalization. This is operationalized by
automatically setting wρ r

( s , a ),bi

retailer are e ρ r

( s , a ), bi

= ci.24 In all three treatments, the non-gasoline expenses of each

= 10 .

For the first 600 periods, cbi = 100 ∀i . In the remaining 600 periods, the refiners’ costs
follow a random walk to simulate changes in price for crude oil on the world market. The
stochastic shocks are distributed as N(0, 15). The number of periods until the next permanent
shock is distributed as U[20, 35]. This means that the refiners’ costs change every 34 to 60
seconds. The subjects are not given this information on the nature of the cost shocks. To reduce
intersession variation, we hold the set of cost realizations constant across all sessions.
Retailer r sets p ρ r

( s , a ), bi

and could adjust this price at any time during the 1200 periods.

Retailers and refiners observe all current retail prices including those set by rival outlets.
However, the current DTW prices are known only by the refiner and the associated retailer. At
the beginning of sessions in the zone and uniform treatments, refiners set initial wholesale
prices, which the branded retailers are forced to accept for the initial inventory of K = 10 units.
Once a location stocks out, the retailer completely replenishes its inventory of K = 10 units at the
current wholesale price. In the event that wholesale prices fall, it is possible that a retail outlet
has gas in its inventory that cost more than current rival retail prices. To avoid the retailer
having to fully absorb losses, the refiners can offer rebates to the retailers for unsold units in
inventory.
23

Generally, stations are contractually prohibited from shifting inventory in natural contexts.
The price setting role of the refiner is eliminated in the company-op treatment and hence no subjects are placed in
the role of refiner in these sessions.

24
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One potential reference prediction for all three treatments is the competitive outcome,

p c = wρ r

( s , a ),bi

+ eρ r

( s , a ),bi

= 100 + 10 = 110 ∀r , s, a, bi (for the first 600 periods). However, no pure

strategy equilibrium at any price exists in the stage game because for ωbi = 0.20 > 0, p ρ r

( s , a ), bi

=

110 + β bi = 110 + 25 = 135 strictly dominates the competitive price (i.e., with positive probability
a brand loyal buyer is willing to purchase a unit at a positive profit for the retailer). Given the
repeated nature of this game and the unknown time horizon, a second potential reference
m
m
and pcorner
at the center and corner stations,
prediction is joint profit-maximizing prices pcenter

respectively. Using a numerical grid search, the expected joint profit-maximizing prices are
m
m
pcenter
= 229 and pcorner
= 224.25

We conducted a total of twelve laboratory sessions, four in each treatment. Each session
lasted no longer than 90 minutes and consisted of 8 subjects in the zone and uniform treatments
and 4 subjects in the company-op treatment, who were recruited from undergraduate classes in
economics, management, and engineering at George Mason University. In each session subjects
were randomly assigned a role.26 Prior to beginning the actual experiment, subjects were given
ample opportunity to ask questions. Each subject only participated in one session and received
US$1 for every 800 of experimental profit. The average payoff across all subjects was $18.25,
including $5 for showing up on time. The total surplus possible in each session was over
US$800. Subjects received their payments in private at the conclusion of the session.

5. Experiment Findings

In what follows we present the results of our experiment as a series of nine findings. We
break down the discussion of the results into two subsections. The first subsection covers the
25

At a center price of 229, a center station will sell to any branded buyer within two blocks, any branded buyer three
blocks away that is also not one block away from a corner station, and any unbranded person within one block of the
center. For the corner prices of 224, corner stations will sell to any unbranded buyer within two blocks, a branded
buyer within two blocks that is more than two blocks from the center stations, and a branded buyer that is two
blocks away and also two away from the center but happens to prefer the brand at the corner. Unbranded buyers at
(1,4), (4,1), (4,7) and (7,4) do not buy at these monopoly prices.
26
To avoid the potentially loaded terms associated with gasoline markets, the refiners and station owners were
referred to as suppliers and store owners, respectively, who were buying and selling a fictitious product. A copy of
the instructions is available from the authors upon request. In an attempt to aid comprehension of the environment,
prior to beginning the experiment, each subject experienced the opposite role for 300 periods (except in the
company-op treatment for which there is only one role). That is, a refiner (retailer) first read the instructions and
participated as a retailer (refiner) for 300 periods, before reading the instructions as a refiner (retailer) and
participating for 1200 periods as a refiner (retailer).
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results from the first 600 periods with stable wholesale costs. We attempt to mitigate learning
effects by focusing our attention on the last half these periods (301-600), though as we will
discuss later, the main story is found in the competitive shakeout at the beginning of the session.
For this set of periods we first estimate the comparative static effects of the zone and uniform
pricing treatments and the location effect of corner and center stations. Then we consider the
effects of divorcement by estimating the comparative static effects of lessee dealers with zone
pricing versus vertically integrated, company-owned stations. The second subsection analyzes
the dynamic adjustment of station prices when the wholesale costs are nonstationary in periods
601-1200.

5.1 Comparative Static Effects with Constant Wholesale Costs
5.1.1 Zone versus Uniform Pricing

As an introduction, consider the following qualitative summary. As permitted in the zone
pricing treatment, refiners clearly and endogenously adopt zone pricing to the retail stations. The
average wholesale price to the corner stations is 174 versus 147 to the center stations. When the
refiners are forced to charge uniform prices, the average wholesale price is 151, but it is unclear
how meaningful this average is considering that there is a large variation in refiner prices across
and within sessions. Wholesale prices in two of the uniform pricing sessions are as high as the
average corner station wholesale prices under zone pricing. In another uniform pricing session,
wholesale prices are approximately equal to average center wholesale prices under zone pricing.
Average wholesale prices in the remaining uniform pricing session are below the average center
wholesale prices with zone pricing.
Figure 2, which contains histograms of all of the posted retail prices, reveals that
consumers do not see lower retail prices with uniform wholesale pricing. The mode for the
corner stations is 200 in both the zone and uniform treatments. The posted prices are slightly
higher in the uniform treatment, as there is considerably more mass distributed across the 210230 bins in the uniform treatment. The effect of a uniform pricing policy on retail prices is
considerably more striking at the central stations. The entire distribution of posted prices shifts
to the right under uniform wholesale pricing. The mode in the uniform treatment is 190, whereas
the mode is only 150 with zone pricing.

11

We first assess the effect of zone and uniform pricing on the transaction prices in each
market. Unlike field studies which rely on posted prices, our dataset contains the actual prices
paid by each buyer. The quantitative results are derived by analyzing the data with a linear
mixed-effects model for repeated measures. The treatment effect (Zone vs. Uniform wholesale
pricing) and location effect (Center vs. Corner station) and an interaction effect are modeled as
zero-one fixed effects, while the 8 independent sessions and the 4 subjects within each session
are modeled as random effects, ei and ζ ir , respectively. Specifically, we estimate the model

Priceirlt = μ + ei + ζ ir + β1Uniformi + β 2 Cornerl + β 3Uniformi × Cornerl + ε irlt ,
where ei ~ N (0, σ 12 ) , ζ ir ~ N (0,σ 22 ) , and ε irlt ~ N (0, σ 32,i ) .27 The sessions are indexed by i; the
subjects acting as retailers within each session are indexed by r = 1, 2, 3, 4; and the repeated
periods are indexed by t (e.g., t = 301, 302, …, 600). Cornerl = 0 if l = (s, a) = (4, 4) and 1
otherwise. The dependent variable Priceirlt is the transaction price received by subject r in
session i at station location l in period t. We also accommodate heteroskedastic errors by
session when estimating the model via maximum likelihood.
Estimates of the treatment and location effects are easy to compute with this
specification. The intercept μ is the expected price in the zone pricing treatment at the center
location, μ + β1 is the expected price in the uniform pricing treatment at a center location, μ + β2
is the expected price in the zone pricing treatment at the corner location, and μ + β1 + β2 + β3 is
the expected price in the uniform pricing treatment at a corner location.
Finding 1: Retail transaction prices are statistically higher in the isolated areas than in the
clustered area. Uniform pricing in the wholesale market increases retail transaction prices in
the clustered area, but has no significant effect on transaction prices in the isolated areas.

Evidence: The mixed effects estimation results presented in Table 1 provide the quantitative
support for this finding. The average retail transaction price with zone pricing at the wholesale
level is μ̂ = 149.98 at a station in the clustered area and μˆ + βˆ 2 = 191.58 in an isolated area, a
27.7% increase. This effect of location is highly significant ( β̂ 2 = 41.60, p-value = 0.0000).
27

It is important to note that the linear mixed effects model for repeated measures treats each session as one degree
of freedom with respect to the treatments. Hence, with two treatment parameters, there are 6 degrees of freedom for
the estimates of the treatment fixed effect (8 sessions – 2 parameters). See Longford (1993) for a description of this
technique commonly employed in experimental sciences.
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With uniform pricing in the wholesale market, the average retail transaction price is μˆ + βˆ1 =
166.38 at a station in the center and μˆ + βˆ1 + βˆ 2 + βˆ 3 =195.87 in the corner. Again the effect of
location is highly significant ( βˆ 2 + βˆ 3 = 29.49, p-value=0.0000). The uniform pricing treatment
effect of βˆ1 = 16.40 at center stations is statistically significant (p-value = 0.0311) and nontrivial
in economic terms—uniform pricing at the wholesale level increases retail transaction prices in
the clustered area by 10.9%. Transaction prices in the isolated stations are slightly higher with
uniform pricing than with zone pricing ( βˆ1 + βˆ 3 = 4.29), but this effect is statistically
insignificant (p-value = 0.4926).
Given the data generated by our experiment we are able to determine that high retail
prices in the isolated areas are not the result of high wholesale prices with zone pricing, but
rather the cause of high wholesale prices. Figure 3 plots average wholesale prices and average
posted retail prices by location for the first 300 periods when subjects are learning about the
competitive pressures or lack thereof. Notice that wholesale prices to corner stations have a
noticeable upward trend in the zone pricing treatment. Over the first 100 periods, corner station
retail prices are very high.

As the refiners recognize that these isolated stations are very

profitable at those prices, the refiners use zone pricing to capture some of the rents from the
corner stations. The clustered area stands in rather marked contrast. As station prices tumble due
to the competition, wholesale prices also fall as the refiners use zone pricing to be more
competitive. Only after station prices stabilize around period 250 do wholesale prices start to
rise as refiners attempt to capture the retailer profits in the clustered area. Ultimately, the
refiners capture more of the profits with zone pricing, but not to the detriment of consumers.
Also, we are able to gain insight as to why uniform pricing in the wholesale market
actually increases transaction prices for consumers in the clustered area. Fundamentally, the
reason is that uniform wholesale pricing forces the refiner to forgo profits in the corner to be
competitive in the center. Thus refiners forced to sell at a uniform price have an incentive to
keep wholesale prices elevated relative to the central wholesale prices with zone pricing. This is
demonstrated in Figure 4, which plots the red refiner’s wholesale price and red retailer’s posted
price for the center red branded station and the average decision by their counterparts for one
session. At the beginning of the session, the red refiner’s price quickly plummets from 231 to
120 and the red center station (s, a) = (4, 4) eventually follows suit. The refiner observes that
13

there are substantial profits accruing at the red corner station (s, a) = (6, 6) and in period 176
raises the wholesale price to 200. When in period 190 the red center station restocks at the new
wholesale price of 200, the station owner is forced to raise the center station’s retail price. The
red retailer maintains a high price at the center location because it cannot compete with the other
central stations which have average retail prices below the red retailer’s wholesale price. As the
red station will not sell these higher-cost units, competition in the center is weakened. When a
second refiner boosts his wholesale price causing a second retailer to raise his center station’s
price, gradually the prices of the other refiners and stations drift upwards. The end result is that
uniform pricing at the wholesale level halts retail competition in the clustered center. In another
session, it only takes one refiner’s unilateral action to initiate this process of mitigating
competition.
Our second finding considers the effect of mandating uniform wholesale pricing on buyer
utility. The ability to collect direct measures of consumer welfare and conduct this analysis is
another major benefit of a laboratory study over a field study where such measures cannot be
collected. Again, we use a linear mixed-effects model to estimate the quantitative effects of the
treatment (Zone vs. Uniform Pricing) on buyer utility. We classify each buyer as one of three
types: interior, equidistant, and periphery. Interior buyers are those closest to the center stations.
These buyers originate at one of the following intersections: (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (3, 4), or (5, 4).
A buyer is equidistant from the center stations and at least one corner station if it originates at (4,
1), (4, 2), (4, 6), (4, 7), (1, 4), (2, 4), (6, 4), (7, 4), (3, 3), (3, 5), (5, 3) or (5, 5). All other buyers
are relatively isolated, being located closer to a corner station, and are categorized as periphery
buyers. The treatment effect, buyer types (Interior, Equidistant, and Periphery) and interaction
effects are modeled as zero-one fixed effects. The sessions are again treated as random effects,

ei, so that the model we estimate is
BuyerUtility it = μ + ei + β 1Uniformi + β 2 Equidistant t + β 3 Peripheryt +

β 4Uniformi × Equidistant t + β 5Uniformi × Peripheryt + ε it
where ei ~ N (0, σ 12 ) and ε it ~ N (0, σ 22,i ) . The sessions are indexed by i and the repeated periods
by t (e.g., t = 301, 302, …, 600). BuyerUtilityit is the utility that the buyer achieved in the
market. We also include heteroskedastic errors by session in the maximum likelihood estimation
of the model.

14

Finding 2: Uniform pricing in the wholesale market decreases buyer welfare for the interior
and equidistant buyers, but has no significant effect on periphery buyers.

Evidence: In the interest of brevity we report the quantitative support only in the text of this
finding. The average buyer utility for interior buyers with zone pricing is μ̂ = 101.58 but with
uniform wholesale pricing, buyer welfare drops by − β̂1 = 17.15, a 16.9% decrease that is
statistically significant (p-value = 0.0491). With zone pricing, equidistant buyers are worse off
than interior buyers because they have further to travel to the lower-price center stations ( βˆ 2 = –
17.45, p-value = 0.0000). However, with uniform wholesale pricing, the welfare for these buyers
is even lower than equidistant buyers in the zone pricing treatment ( βˆ1 + βˆ 4 = –15.01, p-value =
0.0549). The point estimates indicate that periphery buyers are harmed by uniform pricing
( βˆ1 + βˆ5 = –10.05), but this effect is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.1555).
These first two findings directly counter the claims that zone pricing harms consumers
and that uniform pricing would benefit consumers. Uniform pricing in the wholesale market
raises the actual prices that consumers pay and reduces the welfare to all buyers except those on
the periphery. Our next finding reports the impact of uniform wholesale pricing on station and
refiner profits.
Finding 3: Uniform pricing significantly increases station profits, but has no effect on refiner
profits.

Evidence: The average station owner earns profits of 801 with zone pricing and 2304 with
uniform pricing. For the quantitative support for this finding, we use a Wilcoxon rank sum test
to compare the total station owner profits of the four zone pricing sessions with the total station
owner profits of the four uniform sessions. We reject the null hypothesis of equal station owner
profits with a two-sided test (W = 26, n = 4, m = 4, p-value = 0.0286). Average refiner profits
are slightly lower with uniform pricing, 2616 versus 3006 with zone pricing, but a Wilcoxon
rank sum test indicates that this difference is not statistically significant (W = 17, n = 4, m = 4, pvalue = 0.8857).
In sum, we find that uniform wholesale pricing (a) reduces consumer welfare by
increasing the prices that buyers pay at the clustered stations, relative to retail prices under zone
pricing, (b) has no statistical effect on consumer welfare and prices for buyers that are in isolated
areas, (c) increases station owner profits, and (d) has no statistical effect on refiner profits.
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5.1.2 Zone Pricing (Lessee Dealers) versus Company-owned Stations

The effects of vertical integration are also rather striking. Figure 5 displays histograms of
the posted retail prices. The mode for the corner stations is 200 in both the zone and companyowned treatments; however, there is considerably more mass in the left tail of the companyowned treatments.

The effect of vertical integration on retail prices is considerably more

conspicuous at the center stations. The entire distribution of posted prices shifts to the left with
company-owned stations. The mode with lessee dealers is only 120, whereas the mode is 150
under zone pricing with lessee dealers.
For our quantitative analysis, we estimate a linear mixed-effects model for transaction
prices. The treatment effect (Lessee Dealers with Zone Pricing vs. Company-Owned Stations)
and location effect (Center vs. Corner station) and an interaction effect are modeled as zero-one
fixed effects, while the 8 independent sessions and the 4 retailers within each session are
modeled as random effects.
Finding 4: Retail transaction prices with company-owned stations are statistically lower in both
the clustered area and the isolated areas than in the zone pricing treatment.

Evidence: The mixed effects estimation results presented in Table 2 provide the quantitative
support for this finding. With company-owned stations, the average retail transaction price is

μˆ + βˆ1 = 130.22 at a station in the center, which is 13.2% lower than transaction prices with
lessee dealers ( μ̂ = 149.97). This effect is statistically significant ( β̂ 1 = -19.75, p-value =
0.0157). In isolated areas, transaction prices with company-owned stations are -( βˆ1 + βˆ 3 ) =
31.53 less than transaction prices with lessee dealers. This effect is also statistically significant
(p-value = 0.0022), reducing transaction prices by 16.5% from a level of μˆ 1 + βˆ 2 = 191.58 with
lessee dealers to μˆ 1 + βˆ1 + βˆ 2 + βˆ3 = 160.04 with company-owned stations.
Finding 4 reports the extent to which a double markup by refiners and stations raises the
prices that consumers pay vis-à-vis a single markup by company-owned stations. This finding
complements the field studies of Barron and Umbeck (1984) and Vita (2000) and a laboratory
study by Durham (2000), which also find that prices are lower with vertical integration than
without. Our next finding quantifies the additional utility buyers receive from eliminating the
double markup with company-owned stations.
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Finding 5: Relative to the zone pricing treatment, pricing with company-owned stations
increases buyer welfare for all types of buyers: interior, equidistant, and periphery.

Evidence: Again, in the interest of brevity we report the quantitative support in the text of this
finding. With company-owned stations, the utility of interior and equidistant buyers increases by

β̂1 = 20.45 (p-value = 0.0241). (The point estimate for equidistant buyers, βˆ 4 , is small and
insignificant, p-value = 0.4940.) The utility of periphery buyers increases by βˆ1 + βˆ5 = 25.94 (pvalue = 0.0084). These absolute increases in buyer welfare translate into percentage increases of
20.1%, 24.4%, and 50.6% in buyer welfare for the interior, equidistant, and periphery buyers,
respectively.

5.2 Dynamic Adjustments with Nonstationary Wholesale Costs

We now turn our attention to how prices dynamically adjust to nonstationary costs. In
this subsection we investigate how retail prices adjust to changes in station costs. In particular,
we investigate whether station prices respond symmetrically or adjust faster to cost increases
than to decreases.
As a first step, we must determine whether a long run relationship exists between station
prices pt and costs ct (wholesale prices).28 If both pt and ct are nonstationary with a unit root, i.e.,
integrated of order 1, I(1), then we can operationalize the hypothesis of a long run (equilibrium)
relationship between pt and ct using the concept of cointegration developed by Engle and
Granger (1987). Station prices and costs are said to be cointegrated if a linear combination of the
two series is stationary, I(0). If pt and ct have a long run equilibrium relationship, then the short
run dynamics of the cointegrated system also have an error-correction representation. An errorcorrection model of the first differences (Δpt and Δct) includes a term that reflects the current
“error” in the levels of pt and ct in achieving long-run equilibrium. To test whether prices adjust
asymmetrically or symmetrically to changes in cost, we follow Granger and Lee (1989) in
estimating a non-symmetric error correction model, namely,

Δpt = α 1 Δct −1 + α 2 Δpt −1 + φ1 z t −1 + φ 2 z t+−1 + ξ t ,

28

For ease of exposition we are dropping the location, retailer identity, and brand subscripts from per period prices
and costs.
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where ξ t ~ N (0, σ 2 ) , zt-1 is the error-correction term, and z t+−1 = max( z t −1 , 0) . If prices adjust
symmetrically, the speed of the adjustment to the long run equilibrium is captured
by − 1 < φ1 < 0 , with φ 2 = 0.

If prices respond faster to cost increases than decreases, then

− 1 < φ1 < 0 and φ 2 > 0 .

We begin this analysis by considering station prices and costs averaged across all
sessions and subjects for each station location (corner and center) and treatment (zone, uniform,
and company-owned). Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests fail to reject the null hypothesis for all
series. Given that the each of series are found to be I(1), we now consider whether a long run
equilibrium exists between prices and costs for each location in each treatment. This is our sixth
finding.
Finding 6: With zone wholesale pricing and company-owned retail pricing, a long run
relationship exists between station prices and station costs for both center and corner stations;
however no such relationships exist with uniform pricing.

Evidence: The results of Johansen cointegration tests serve as the qualitative support for this
finding.29 Likelihood ratio (LR) tests of the number of cointegrating equations indicate that there
is 1 cointegrating equation at the 1% level of significance for both corner and center stations with
zone wholesale pricing and that there is 1 cointegrating equation at the 5% level of significance
for both corner and center stations with company-owned retail pricing. However, the LR tests
reject any cointegration with uniform pricing at the 5% level of significance for either locale.
Finding 6 indicates that a long run equilibrium between station prices and costs with zone
wholesale pricing and with company-owned retail pricing. Shocks to costs, both positive and
negative, are passed-through to customers via changes in station prices according to a stable long
run relationship between the two series. In contrast, we find that uniform wholesale pricing
breaks down the long run relationship between costs and prices at both center and corner
stations. This means that any relationship implied by a regression of prices on costs in levels is
spurious.

Changes in costs still may lead to changes in prices, but there is no short run

adjustment of prices toward a long run relationship with costs when costs experience a shock.
Uniform pricing purges the responsiveness of retail prices to cost changes, the negative
implication being that when wholesale costs fall, retail prices do not follow. This also means that
29

Schwarz criteria indicate that a one period lag is superior to any other lag specification from two to thirty. The
test assumption also assumes no deterministic trend in the data since none was included in the induced wholesale
costs.
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retail prices are insulated to increases in wholesale costs, but we also observe in Finding 2 that
uniform wholesale pricing generates high retail prices in the clustered area.
Our seventh finding addresses the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon in the retail
gasoline industry with zone wholesale pricing (7a) and company-owned retail pricing (7b),
where a long run equilibrium relationship exists.
Finding 7a: Station prices in the clustered area adjust quickly and asymmetrically to changes in
costs with zone pricing. Station prices in isolated areas adjust more slowly, but symmetrically to
changes in costs.

Evidence: For the sake of brevity, we report the estimates of the error-correction model in the
text of the finding. First, we report that the error-correction term is highly significant and is
largely responsible for explaining the adjustment of prices (p-value < 0.0001 for both center and
corner stations). When the error-correction term is positive (i.e., costs are lower relative to what
is specified in the long run equilibrium given prices), the speed of adjustment for center stations
is considerably slower ( φˆ1 + φˆ2 = -0.176 + 0.128 = -.048) than when error-correction term is
negative ( φˆ1 = -0.176). For the center stations, impulse response functions indicate that over 90%
of an increase in costs is reflected in the price in just 11 periods (or just 18.7 seconds of
experiment time), but in the same amount of time only 40% of a decrease in costs is passedthrough. In fact, it takes 45 periods (or 76.5 seconds) for 90% of a cost decrease to be reflected in
the price at center stations. The speed of adjustment for corner stations is slower than for center
stations ( φˆ1 = -0.047) and is symmetric ( φˆ2 is statistically insignificant with a p-value =
0.1650).
Finding 7b: With company-owned retail pricing, station prices adjust symmetrically and much
more slowly to changes in station costs.

Evidence: The error-correction term φˆ1 is significant for both center and corner stations (p-value
= 0.0001 and 0.0353, respectively), but φˆ2 is statistically insignificant (p-values = 0.9522 and
0.7719). For the center stations, 90% of an increase in costs is reflected in the price in 123
periods, and at corner stations it takes 152 periods for 90% of a cost increase to be reflected in
the price.
Having found at an aggregate level that prices adjust asymmetrically at the center stations
with zone wholesale pricing, we continue to exploit our dataset to investigate asymmetric price
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responses to costs. First, we estimate error-correction models for the center stations at the
session level and then for each individual station owner in each of the four zone pricing
sessions.30 In the interest of brevity, we focus on the estimates at the session level but only
classify the individual station owners by whether φˆ2 is (a) statistically positive, (b) statistically
not different than zero, (c) statistically negative, or by (d) not having cointegrated prices and
costs.
Finding 8: At the session level, station prices in the clustered area adjust asymmetrically to
changes in costs with zone pricing. Individual station owners are predominantly and equally
classified as one of two behavioral types: asymmetric and symmetric adjusters.

Evidence: In three of the four sessions, the error-correction model indicates that prices rise faster
than they fall in response to cost changes ( φˆ2 > 0 with p-values = 0.0051, 0.0740, and 0.0000). In
the fourth session, prices actually fall faster than they rise ( φˆ2 < 0 with p-value = 0.0107). The
three sessions that adjust faster to cost increases include 3, 1, 2 subjects, respectively, who are
classified as an asymmetric adjuster ( φˆ2 is statistically greater than 0). The fourth session
contains three symmetric adjusters and one station owner who decreases prices faster than he
increases them in response to cost changes. Of the 16 station owners, 6 respond faster to cost
increases than to decreases and 6 respond symmetrically.
Finding 8 is important in that it reveals that only a minority of firms need to adjust prices
asymmetrically to generate the overall effect that we report in Finding 7a. This raises the
important qualification for field studies that employ price indices, for as few as just one out of
four firms can generate a rockets and feathers pricing pattern at an industry level.

6. Conclusion

The gasoline industry is an intricate system, making the implications of policies such as
prohibiting zone pricing and vertical integration unclear from anecdotal evidence alone.
However, such topics are regularly debated in the political arena.

Consumers and media

routinely scrutinize retail gasoline prices looking for evidence of anticompetitive behavior. The
sheer magnitude and social interest in this market has led numerous research studies of the
30

Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for all series fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, and unless otherwise
noted, Johansen cointegration tests indicate that all pairs of price and cost series are cointegrated. The Schwarz
criteria also continue to indicate that 1 lag is superior to any other lag specification.
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industry. Unfortunately, this field research must rely on incomplete information. In this study
we detail a laboratory investigation of the gasoline industry, focusing specifically on uniform
pricing at the wholesale level, divorcement, and asymmetric retail price responses to cost shocks.
Our study provides a series of insights into the effect of zone pricing. In many situations
our results provide support for hypotheses formalized by previous researchers. First, prices in
relatively isolated areas are higher than prices in areas with a clustering of stations. Contrary to
the claims expressed by proponents of uniform pricing legislation, uniform wholesale pricing
actually increases prices in the more competitive area and simultaneously does not alter prices in
more isolated geographic areas that are less competitive. Due to this behavior, uniform pricing
actually reduces the welfare of buyers who are closest to the center area, as well as those who are
on the border of the center and isolated areas. The buyer losses are not the refiners’ gains. In
fact we find that refiners’ profits are unaffected by the uniform pricing. Instead, it is the retailers
that are extracting surplus from the consumers. The data offer a simple explanation for this
result. Under uniform pricing, the refiners offer a price that is above the center area zone
wholesale price and below the isolated area zone wholesale price. These refiners are balancing
extracting economic rents from the isolated stations and remaining viable in the competitive,
center area. Thus, a refiner’s gains in the center area, due to higher wholesale prices, are offset
by reduced earnings in the isolated markets where wholesale prices have decreased and profits
are unchanged. With uniform pricing the retailers do not gain a profit margin in the center area
but do receive a larger margin in the isolated regions where retail prices are unchanged but
wholesale prices have declined.
On the issue of divorcement we find that company-owned stations eliminate the double
markup of prices. From this we can conclude that divorcement legislation harms consumers. All
buyers, in clustered or isolated areas, pay lower prices and have substantially higher utility when
stations are company-owned. This price finding in the laboratory (buyer utility cannot be
directly measured in field studies) affirms the results from field studies, lending some credence
to our other findings.
Numerous studies have demonstrated an asymmetry in gasoline price responses. In the
laboratory we are able to investigate this pattern while controlling for collusion, menu costs, and
buyer search.

With zone pricing, the practice in place when previous studies evaluated

asymmetric price responses, we find that retail prices and retail costs are cointegrated, i.e., a long
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term equilibrium relationship exists between the two series. Our data indicate that prices in the
center area adjust more quickly to costs increases than to cost decreases, but we find that in
isolated areas price responses are symmetric.

At the market (session) level we find that

responses are influenced by the idiosyncrasies of individual retailers, some of whom respond
symmetrically and some of whom respond asymmetrically. Further, a retailer’s type is not
correlated with the volatility of its wholesaler’s prices. However, retailers who observe more
volatile wholesale prices during periods of increasing wholesale costs (or world oil prices) are
more likely to respond asymmetrically.

With company-owned stations, prices adjust

symmetrically to cost shocks. Further, this response is substantially slower in the companyowned treatment than with zone pricing.
In addition to benefiting retailers at the expense of consumers, another effect of uniform
pricing is the destruction of the long term relationship between retail prices and costs. Formally,
we find that with uniform wholesale pricing, retail costs and prices are not cointegrated and
therefore any reduction in wholesale costs, say due to changes in the world price for oil, would
not necessarily be reflected in retail prices.
As with any empirical study in the field or laboratory, the inherent specificity of a data
set is determined by such details as the environment and institution. Like with all empirical
studies one must take this into account when inferring broader implications from the results.
Further research would be useful in examining how the exogenous location and number of
stations, as well as endogenous and costly entry and exit, affect our findings. Along the lines of
Shepard (1993), it would also be useful to explore the endogenous formation of vertical
relationships in laboratory markets, and how the interaction of different vertical relationships
affects retail competition.
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Table 1. Estimates of the Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Transaction Prices:
Zone vs. Uniform Pricing
μ

Uniform (β1)
Corner (β2)
Uniform × Corner (β3)

Estimate
149.98
16.40
41.60
-12.11

Std.
Error
4.13
5.85
0.75
1.05

†

Degrees of
Freedom
t-statistic
2305
36.30
6
2.80
2305
55.40
2305
-11.56
2339 Obs.
H a: β 1 + β 3 ≠ 0
H a: β 2 + β 3 > 0

p-value
0.0000
0.0311
0.0000†
0.0000
0.4926
0.0000†

One-sided test.
Note: The linear mixed-effects model is estimated by maximum likelihood. For brevity, the
session and subject random effects are not included in this table or any others.

Table 2. Estimates of the Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Transaction Prices:
Zone Pricing with Lessee Dealers vs. Company-Owned Stations
μ

Company-owned (β1)
Corner (β2)
Company-owned × Corner (β3)

†

Std.
Error
4.99
7.06
0.75
1.20

Estimate
149.97
-19.75
41.60
-11.78

Degrees of
Freedom
t-statistic
2340
30.08
6
-2.80
2340
55.40
2340
-9.81
2374 Obs.
H a: β 1 + β 3 < 0
H a: β 2 + β 3 > 0

p-value
0.0000
0.0157†
0.0000†
0.0000
0.0022†
0.0000†

One-sided test.
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Figure 1. Geographic Depiction of the Laboratory Retail Gasoline Market
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Figure 2. Histograms of Station Posted Prices: Zone vs. Uniform Pricing
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Figure 4. Example of How High Prices Arise in the Center with Uniform Wholesale Prices

Corner Stations with Zone Pricing

1600

1400

1400

1200

1200

1000
800
600

1000
800
600

400

400

200

200

0

0
110

130

150

170

190
210
Price Bins

230

250

More

110

Center Stations with Zone Pricing

1800

130

1600

1400

1400

1200

1200

1000
800
600

150

170

190
210
Price Bins

230

250

More

250

More

Company-Owned Center Stations

1800

1600
Frequency

Frequency

Company-Owned Corner Stations

1800

1600

Frequency

Frequency

1800

1000
800
600

400

400

200

200
0

0
110

130

150

170

190
210
Price Bins

230

250

More

110

130

150

170

190
210
Price Bins

230

Figure 5. Histograms of Station Posted Prices: Zone Pricing (Lessee Dealer) vs. Company-Owned Stations

27

Appendix: Instructions for “Experimental Gasoline Markets”
Store (Station) Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The instructions are simple.
If you read them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
From this point on, all references are in terms of computer dollars. There are two types
of sellers in this experiment: store sellers and supplier sellers. In this experiment you
will be a store seller for a series of trading periods. There are 3 other store sellers and
4 total supplier sellers. As a store owner you will buy a fictitious good from the
suppliers and sell it to the computer, who will act as the buyers who purchase the good
from you.
The stores that you and the other store owners operate are located on the grid
displayed on your screen. The upper left portion of the screen indicates which stores
you will make decisions for.
Notice that the color of your stores is {Insert: blue, green, red, or pink}. This means
that you can only buy from a supplier that offers the same color of the fictitious product
as you. The suppliers are listed at the top right portion of the screen.
To choose a supplier, click once on the circle in the grid for a store that you operate.
Then click on the supplier from whom you would like to buy the product. The ‘price’ is
how much that supplier is willing to sell the product to you. {Uniform Treatment Only:
The supplier price will be the same for each store of the same color.} {Zone Treatment
Only: The supplier price can be different for each store.}
At the time you buy from the supplier, you have agreed to purchase 10 units at this
price from the supplier. The supplier may lower this price in which case the remaining
units will be sold at the lower price.
This information will be displayed on the ‘Purchases’ tab. While you have agreed to buy
10 units at the supplier’s price, you do not incur the cost for each unit until you have
sold the unit. As you sell units to the computer buyers, these rows will be filled in. We
will now discuss how you earn profit in the experiment and then how the computer
buyers purchase.
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Earnings
You earn profit by selling at a store price greater than your costs. You have two costs.
The first cost is the supplier price that you pay the supplier for the units you sell. The
second cost is the store cost that you incur for selling each unit. For example, suppose
that your price is 180, the supplier price is 140, and the store cost is 10. Your profit
from selling one unit at that price is 180 – 140 – 10 = 30. More generally, your profit is
Profit = Price Received – Supplier cost – Store cost.
If you do not sell a unit, you do not incur either the supplier or store costs.
To set your price at a store, double click on the store circle and submit your desired
price. The prices of each store are displayed in the circles on the grid as ‘P = 180’, for
example.
Buyers
The computer will act as the buyers in this experiment. Every 1.7 seconds, which we
will also call a period, a buyer will come to purchase a unit from one of the stores in
grid. A car (the buyer) will randomly appear at one of the intersections of the grid. To
purchase from a store, the buyer must travel to an intersection where a store is
located. Before traveling, the maximum value the buyer is willing to pay for a unit is
240. This maximum value falls more and more the further a buyer must travel to
purchase from a store.
More Information on the Buyers
There are five types of buyers. A grey buyer receives an additional value of 0 from
purchasing from any colored store.
A blue buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a blue store. In
other words, if a blue buyer purchases from a blue store, the most the buyer is willing
to pay is 265. If a blue buyer purchases from any other colored store, the most that
same buyer is willing to pay is 240.
Similarly, a red buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a red
store; a green buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a green
store; and a pink buyer will buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing
from a pink store.
On average, 20% of buyers are grey, 20% are blue, 20% are red, 20% are green, and
20% are pink.
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Finally, each buyer will purchase from the store that yields it the greatest difference
between the price it must pay at the store and its value after traveling to it. If the price
is greater than a buyer’s value at all stores, then the buyer will not purchase from any
store.
Summary
You can change your store price at any time by double clicking on the circle and
submitting your new price.
You can change your supplier by clicking once on your store and then choosing the
supplier from the upper right portion of your screen. Please note that some stores may
not have a choice of suppliers. A new choice of supplier will not go into effect until you
have sold all of the 10 units, as displayed on the ‘Purchases’ tab.
History
The ‘Purchases’ tab displays a history of all of your sales to the buyers and your profit
per unit. The upper left portion of the ‘City Grid’ tab shows your total cumulative profit.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand
and a monitor will come by to answer your question. Your earnings in the experiment
will be converted into cash at the rate of 800 computer dollars for 1 U.S. dollar. If
you are ready to proceed into the market, click on the ‘Start’ button.
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Supplier (Refiner) Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The instructions are simple.
If you read them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
From this point on, all references are in terms of computer dollars. There are two types
of sellers in this experiment: store sellers and supplier sellers. In this experiment you
will be a supplier seller for a series of trading periods. There are 3 other suppliers and
4 total store sellers. As a supplier you will sell a fictitious good to the store sellers, who
in turn sell it to buyers. The computer will act as the buyers in the experiment.
The stores are located on the grid and displayed as circles on your screen. The building
icon on the top part of the screen represents you as a supplier.
Notice that the stores and your supplier icon have different colors. In particular, your
supplier color is {Insert: blue, green, red, or pink}.
Stores will choose a supplier from whom they will purchase. The ‘price’ is how much
you are willing to sell the product to a store. {Uniform Treatment only: The price you
set will be the same for each store of the same color.} {Zone Treatment only: The price
you set can be different for each store.}
A store decides to purchase 10 units at a time at the price you have set. If you lower
this price, the remaining units will be sold at the lower price. You earn the profit from
those sales only if the store can resell the unit to a buyer (the computer). You earn
profit by selling at a price greater than your cost. For example, suppose that your price
is 140 and your cost per unit is 110. Your profit from selling one unit at that price is
140 – 110 = 30. More generally, your profit is
Your Profit = Price Received – Cost.
How Stores Earn Profits
Stores earn profit by selling at a store price greater than their costs. Stores have two
costs. The first cost is the supplier price that you set. The second cost is the store cost
that you do not know. For example, suppose that the store sets a price of 180, your
supplier price is 140, and the store cost is 10. The store’s profit from selling one unit is
180 – 140 – 10 = 30. More generally, a store’s profit is
Store Profit = Price Paid by Buyer – Supplier Price You Set – Store cost.
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The prices of each store are displayed in the circles as ‘P = 180’, for example.
You only receive a profit if a store sells a unit to a buyer. If a store does not sell a unit,
you do not earn profit. Your profit is updated every 10 periods and is displayed in the
upper left portion of your screen.
Buyers
The computer will act as the buyers in this experiment. Every 1.7 seconds, which we
will also call a period, a buyer will come to purchase a unit from one of the stores in
grid. A car (the buyer) will randomly appear at one of the intersections of the grid. To
purchase from a store, the buyer must travel to an intersection where a store is
located. Before traveling, the maximum value the buyer is willing to pay for a unit is
240. This maximum value falls more and more the further a buyer must travel to
purchase from a store.
More Information the Buyers
There are five types of buyers. A grey buyer receives an additional value of 0 from
purchasing from any colored store.
A blue buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a blue store. In
other words, if a blue buyer purchases from a blue store, the most the buyer is willing
to pay is 265. If a blue buyer purchases from any other colored store, the most that
same buyer is willing to pay is 240.
Similarly, a red buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a red
store; a green buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a green
store; and a pink buyer will buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing
from a pink store.
On average, 20% of buyers are grey, 20% are blue, 20% are red, 20% are green, and
20% are pink.
Finally, each buyer will purchase from the store that yields it the greatest difference
between the price it must pay at the store and its value after traveling to it. If the price
is greater than a buyer’s value at all stores, then the buyer will not purchase from any
store.
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Summary
You can change your supplier prices at any time by double clicking on the supplier icon
and submitting your new prices. Once this price has been confirmed any store that
purchases from you will pay you that price when it, in turn, sells the good to a buyer.
Recall that you only receive a profit if your store sells a unit to a buyer.
History
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand
and a monitor will come by to answer your question. Your earnings in the experiment
will be converted into cash at the rate of 800 computer dollars for 1 U.S. dollar. If
you are ready to proceed into the market, click on the ‘Start’ button.
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